I. INTRODUCTION
The issue of disability-related misconduct arises frequently in both employment cases and lawyer-discipline cases. Employees who are discharged for misconduct often argue that their misconduct was causally connected to a disability. Similarly, lawyers facing sanctions for violating professional responsibility rules often claim that their misconduct was disability-related. The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), which 1 prohibits discrimination because of disability, applies in both scenarios. Title I governs the employment context, and Title II covers public services, which 2 include state disciplinary proceedings against lawyers. 3 Despite these similarities, while employees often rely on the ADA to challenge discharge from employment, lawyers only infrequently cite the 4 ADA in their disciplinary proceedings. This Article explores the reasons 5 behind the disuse of the ADA by lawyers and the implications of taking the ADA seriously in lawyer-discipline cases. Those implications include treating disability as a mandatory mitigating factor, focusing on the likelihood of the attorney committing future misconduct, and adopting a more sophisticated approach to causation, fault, and deterrence.
II. DISUSE OF THE ADA BY ATTORNEYS IN DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS
To fall within the ADA's protected class, a lawyer must be a qualified individual with a disability, which the statute defines as "an individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable modifications to rules, policies, or practices, . . . meets the essential eligibility requirements for the receipt of services or the participation in programs or activities provided by a public entity." The statute defines disability as "a physical or mental impairment 6 that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities" of the individual in question, "a record of such an impairment," or "being regarded as having such an impairment." Whether a particular attorney's impairment 7 satisfies the ADA's definition of disability is outside the scope of this Article. 8 Title II of the ADA prohibits discrimination by public entities against qualified individuals with disabilities, and courts agree that it applies to 9 lawyer discipline proceedings. 10 Despite the consensus that the ADA is applicable to attorney disciplinary proceedings, the statute is seldom mentioned in the state court decisions of such proceedings. Recent searches revealed that since the ADA's effective date, less than four percent of decisions discussing both disability and misconduct also cited the ADA.
Most attorneys facing discipline for 11 12. See, e.g., In re Hasenbank, 151 P.3d 1, 6 (Kan. 2007 ) (lacking reference to ADA where attorney claimed depression and bipolar disorder caused his misconduct); In re Conduct of Coyner, 149 P.3d 1118 , 1123 (Or. 2006 ) (lacking reference to ADA where attorney claimed mental disability and alcoholism caused his misconduct); In re Stoller, 902 So. 2d 981, 984 (La. 2005 ) (lacking reference to ADA where attorney claimed Parkinson's Disease and depression contributed to his misconduct).
13. STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS § 9.32 (1992) [hereinafter ABA STANDARDS]. 14. Id. § 9.32(i). 15. Id. § 9.32(h); see also In re Peasley, 90 P.3d 764, 776 (Ariz. 2004 ) (stating that a sustained period of rehabilitation and the unlikelihood of recurrence are not relevant when an attorney claims physical disability as a mitigating factor, but only when he or she claims mental disability or chemical dependency).
16. Leslie C. Levin, The Emperor's Clothes and Other Tales about the Standards for Imposing Lawyer Discipline Sanctions, 48 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 33 (1998 ). 17. See, e.g., In re Coyner, 149 P.3d 1118 , 1123 (Or. 2006 ) (citing ABA STANDARDS, supra note 13, § 9.32); Lawyer Disciplinary Bd. v. Dues, 624 S.E.2d 125, 133 (W. Va. 2005 ) ("Because we believe that the mitigating mental disability standard established by the ABA is sound, we adopt that standard.").
18. See, e.g., In re Hasenbank, 151 P.3d 1, 6 (Kan. 2007) ; In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against misconduct that may be causally connected to a disability do not make arguments based on the ADA.
12
Why do so many lawyers with disabilities, when their ability to engage in their profession is in question, fail to assert the protections of the ADA? One explanation is that courts will often find an attorney's disability to be a factor mitigating the severity of a rule violation even without consideration of the ADA. The American Bar Association Standards for Imposing Lawyer Discipline (ABA Standards) include disability and chemical dependency as part of a list of circumstances that "may justify a reduction in the degree of discipline to be imposed."
According to the ABA Standards, mental 13 disability or chemical dependency may be a mitigating circumstance, provided that four factors are met:
(1) there is medical evidence that the respondent is affected by a chemical dependency or mental disability; (2) the chemical dependency or mental disability caused the misconduct; (3) the respondent's recovery from the chemical dependency or mental disability is demonstrated by a meaningful and sustained period of successful rehabilitation; and (4) the recovery arrested the misconduct and recurrence of that misconduct is unlikely.
14 Interestingly, physical disability is also listed as a mitigating circumstance but without the above limiting factors. consider disability as a potential mitigating factor as a matter of course, attorneys may see no need to assert their rights under the ADA in disciplinary proceedings. In addition, citing the ADA in a disciplinary proceeding does not appear to have benefitted any lawyer. This fact is somewhat surprising, given that the first published attorney discipline case discussing the ADA contains reasoning that is potentially helpful to some attorneys with disabilities. The attorney in Florida Bar v. Clement claimed that sanctioning him for misappropriating the funds of two clients would violate the ADA due to his bipolar disorder. The
19
Florida Supreme Court first concluded that the ADA was not applicable because the attorney's misconduct was not a "direct result" of his bipolar disorder, finding an insufficient causal connection between the lawyer's disability and his misconduct. Nonetheless, the court stated that even if the 20 element of causation was satisfied, the ADA still would not prevent the court from imposing sanctions: Clement is not "qualified" to be a member of the [b]ar because he committed serious misconduct, and no "reasonable modifications" are possible. Although Clement was under psychiatric care for his bipolar disorder when the incidents in this case occurred, Clement also said he could fool his doctor into believing that he was in control during some of the period in question. This suggests that nothing could prevent repetition of the egregious misconduct in this case.
21
The last two sentences are crucial: If the lawyer was receiving treatment for his disability at the time he engaged in the misconduct, and if even his psychiatrist could not tell when he was significantly impaired by his disability, this suggests that the lawyer is likely to continue to commit similar misconduct in the future. The ability to avoid misappropriating client funds-one of the most serious ethical violations possible-is certainly one 22. One possibility might be requiring the attorney to practice with another lawyer and to have no access to client funds. However, even that possibility may provide insufficient protection to clients. If an attorney has a propensity to misappropriate client funds-committing such a dramatic betrayal of the attorney-client relationship-the attorney may be likely to commit other misconduct as well.
23. 919 P.2d 1114 (Okla. 1996 of the "essential eligibility requirements" for membership in a state bar. It is difficult to imagine what "reasonable modification" could enable someone with a propensity to steal client funds to avoid doing so. Accordingly, the 22 lawyer did not appear to be a "qualified individual with a disability," and the court correctly found that the ADA did not prohibit his disbarment. The Clement court's forward-looking analysis of the ADA concepts of "qualified" and "reasonable modification" could assist some attorneys with disabilities in their disciplinary proceedings. This analysis suggests that if successful treatment or a restructuring of one's practice has rendered an attorney unlikely to repeat her misconduct in the future, the attorney is a "qualified individual with a disability" who falls within the ADA's protection. Subsequent courts, however, have ignored this aspect of Clement's reasoning.
In Unlike the reasoning in Clement, the Busch court's discussion of the ADA focused entirely on the fact that the attorney had committed the misconduct in the past; it contained no analysis of whether the attorney was 26 likely to continue to commit misconduct in the future. This lack of analysis is surprising given that later in the opinion the court noted that the attorney's Attention Deficit Disorder, which caused some of his misconduct, was "now under control." Thus, taking a forward-looking approach, perhaps the 27 attorney in Busch was a qualified individual with a disability falling within the Bd., No. 95-1259 , 1996 WL 78312, at *3 (6th Cir. Feb. 22, 1996 (rejecting attorney's claim that the Michigan Attorney Discipline Board violated the ADA by disciplining him: "Since Doe's disability, if it indeed has caused his acts of misconduct, has precluded him from satisfying the most basic ethical requirements of his profession, he is not qualified under the provisions of the ADA"). Neither the Marshall nor the Doe court based its "qualified" analysis on whether the lawyer was likely to continue to commit misconduct in the future. Milloy, 571 N.W.2d 39, 46-47 (Minn. 1997) . In its sole paragraph discussing the ADA, the court cited Busch and Clement, never mentioned "qualified" or "reasonable modification," and concluded, "We too have a duty to impose discipline when it is necessary to protect the public regardless of an attorney's disability." Id.
31. See, e.g., Columbus Bar Ass'n v. Elsass, 713 N.E.2d 421, 425 (Ohio 1999) (stating that the ADA "does not prevent the discipline of attorneys with disabilities"); People v. Reynolds, 933 P.2d 1295 , 1305 (Colo. 1997 ) ("In accord with the Florida and Oklahoma supreme courts, we conclude that the ADA does not prevent us from disciplining the respondent.").
32. Notably, the Florida Supreme Court, despite the promise of its forward-looking approach to the meaning of the term "qualified" in Clement, gave short shrift to the ADA in a later case, Florida Bar v. protection of the ADA. However, instead of carefully applying the ADA's "qualified" and "reasonable modification" factors to the facts of the case, the court simply concluded, "As the Florida Supreme Court stated, the ADA does not prevent the discipline of attorneys with disabilities." 28 Other courts have followed Busch and its misreading of Clement, holding that disabled attorneys who have committed misconduct are per se not "qualified" individuals within the meaning of the ADA.
Rather than 29 engaging in careful analysis of whether the lawyer was likely to commit misconduct in the future, these courts rejected the relevance of the ADA with such statements as: "The purpose of disciplinary proceedings is the protection of the public and the need for protection is the same whether or not the attorney is mentally impaired." Moreover, some courts' ADA analyses 30 consist solely of citing Busch and Clement in support of the proposition that the ADA does not bar the discipline of attorneys with disabilities. None of 31 these courts considered the possibility that the ADA, while not mandating that attorneys who engage in disability-related misconduct receive no discipline, might be relevant in determining the extent of the discipline they should receive.
32
Gross, 896 So. 2d 742, 743 (Fla. 2005) . In Gross, Lee Howard Gross committed numerous serious acts of misconduct, including misappropriating over $100,000 in client funds and forging the signatures of both clients and a judge. Id. at 743. Gross presented substantial evidence regarding his addiction to drugs and alcohol and rehabilitation from that addiction; nonetheless, the court concluded that he should be disbarred for five years. Id. at 743, 747. Gross argued that, although the ADA did not dictate that he should receive no discipline for his misconduct, the statute indicated that he should receive a less severe sanction than a five-year disbarment. Id. at 747. In response to Gross's argument, the court noted only that he could seek readmission after five years and that "this [c]ourt has already rejected this same type of argument in Florida Bar v. Clement." Id. 33. See, e.g., Elsass, 713 N.E.2d at 425 (imposing an indefinite suspension, rather than the "normal" penalty of disbarment, on attorney who continued to practice law while under suspension, in part because of attorney's successful recovery from drug and alcohol abuse); State ex rel. Oklahoma Bar Ass'n v. Busch, 919 P.2d 1114 , 1120 (Okla. 1996 (stating that the court is " [t] aking [the attorney's] neurological deficit, now under control, into account as mitigation"); In re Disciplinary Action Against Milloy, 571 N.W.2d 39, 47 (Minn. 1997) (stating that the lawyer's diagnosis of ADD may serve as mitigating factor).
34. Elsass, 713 N.E.2d at 425 (Shaw, J., dissenting). Similarly, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals approved reasoning by the Board of Professional Responsibility which reflected incredulity and outrage at an attorney's ADA claim. The Board stated, We cannot and do not believe that Congress intended the ADA to be a shield, much less a sword, to be wielded against appropriate discipline of lawyers who break disciplinary rules. We cannot and do not believe that Congress intended that a lawyer who misappropriates client funds and fabricates evidence to coverup [sic] his wrongdoing should be insulated by the ADA from the efforts of the public authorities of the District of Columbia to protect the public from him. Marshall, 762 A.2d at 535.
The lack of success experienced by any attorney who cited the ADA in a disciplinary proceeding helps explain why so few lawyers make ADA-based arguments. Moreover, many of the courts that have rejected the relevance of the ADA nonetheless considered the attorney's disability as a potential mitigating factor under their non-ADA-based standards.
Accordingly, 33 reliance on the ADA may appear unnecessary as well as futile. Citing the ADA may even pose a risk of harming a lawyer's case. A judge in one case, dissenting from the majority's decision to impose a sanction of indefinite suspension, contended that the court should disbar the attorney in part due to his "effort to evade responsibility for his own conduct via a less than bona fide effort to invoke relief under the ADA."
34
To date, the ADA has played no effective role in attorney discipline cases. Section III, below, explores some of the implications of taking the ADA seriously in the law of lawyer regulation.
616
UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH LAW REVIEW [Vol. 69:609 35. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 13, § § 2.2-2.6. The standards also mention probation as a possible sanction but do not list probation as the proposed sanction for any offense. Id. § 2.7.
36. Id. § 3.0(a)-(c).
fter making the initial determination as to the appropriate sanction, the court would then consider any relevant aggravating or mitigating factors"); see also § 3.0(d); § 9.22 (listing aggravating factors); § 9.32 (listing mitigating factors).
38. Id. § 9.32 (emphasis added). 39. Id. § 9.32 cmt.
III. THE PROPER ROLE OF THE ADA IN ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS
A careful consideration of the ADA in lawyer disciplinary proceedings would lead to change in three main areas. First, the attorney's disability would be a required, rather than an optional, mitigating factor. Second, courts would pay more attention to the likelihood of the lawyer committing misconduct in the future and would emphasize client protection as the primary purpose of lawyer discipline. Third, courts would adopt a more sophisticated understanding of causation, fault, and deterrence. Significantly, under most circumstances, finding that an attorney's misconduct was caused by his or her disability would remain a mitigating factor rather than a complete excuse.
A. Disability as a Required Mitigating Factor
The ABA Standards provide suggested sanctions-disbarment, suspension, public reprimand, or private admonition-based on three factors.
35
The factors are the ethical duty violated (whether that duty was owed to a client, the public, the legal system, or the profession), the lawyer's mental state (intent, knowledge, or negligence), and the seriousness of the actual or potential harm caused by the lawyer's misconduct. The standards then 36 provide that aggravating or mitigating factors could affect the suggested sanction.
37
The ABA Standards include disability as a potential, but not mandatory, mitigating factor. Mental disability and chemical dependency are included in a list of thirteen factors that "may justify a reduction in the degree of discipline to be imposed." The commentary to the provision on mitigating 38 factors provides that the weight given to mental disability and chemical dependency should vary based on the closeness of the causal connection between the disability and the misconduct. According to the commentary, With respect to the "discrimination" argument, respondent is not being disciplined because he is or was a cocaine addict. He is not being "discriminated" against "by reason of such disability." He is being disciplined because he misappropriated client funds and fabricated evidence. This is not "discrimination" against a cocaine addict. Any lawyer not addicted to cocaine, who did the same thing, would be disciplined in the same way, for the same reasons. Disciplining a lawyer for dishonesty is not "discriminating" against someone for a "disability." 762 A.2d 530, 535-36 (D.C. 2000); see also Doe v. Attorney Discipline Bd., No. 95-1259 , 1996 WL 78312, at *3 (6th Cir. Feb. 22, 1996 ("The defendants did not suspend Doe because he has a disability, but rather because he repeatedly breached the most basic duties of an attorney, i.e., made misrepresentations to clients, failed to abide by deadlines.").
44. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) ("No covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of such individual in regard to . . . [various] terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.").
45. Id. § § 12112(a), 12112(b)(3)(A) (defining prohibited discrimination as including "utilizing standards, criteria, or methods of administration that have the effect of discrimination on the basis of disability"); § § 12112(a), 12112(b)(6) (defining prohibited discrimination as including "using qualification standards, employment tests or other selection criteria that screen out or tend to screen out an individual with a disability or a class of individuals with disabilities unless the standard, test or other selection criteria, as used by [the employer], is shown to be job-related for the position in question and is consistent with business necessity").
given great weight." As noted by a critic of the standards, "It is unclear, 40 however, whether the reference to weight refers to how this factor should be weighed against the initial determination or how to weigh this factor against other [aggravating or mitigating] factors." 41 In contrast to the optional approach taken by the ABA Standards, the ADA mandates consideration of disability as a mitigating factor provided that the attorney is a qualified individual with a disability. Some courts have misinterpreted this requirement of the ADA by focusing on Title II's prohibition of "discrimination" by a public entity or exclusion from participation in the activities of a public entity "by reason of [] disability."
42
These courts have reasoned that as long as they assign the same sanction to similarly situated disabled and non-disabled attorneys, they are not committing discrimination on the basis of disability.
43
This reasoning reflects a fundamental misunderstanding of the scope of the obligations imposed by Title II of the ADA. Admittedly, this confusion is not surprising in light of differences in the language of Titles I and II. Title I expressly defines prohibited discrimination as including not only disparate treatment, but also disparate impact and failure to make reasonable A cursory reading of the statutory language can leave the impression that Title II simply prohibits intentional exclusion against the disabled solely because of their status as "disabled." A more thorough review, however, reveals that, rather than preventing public entities from treating the disabled differently than the nondisabled, Title II requires that public entities make certain accommodations for the disabled in order to ensure their access to government programs. Id. at 1028.
50. § 12131(2).
accommodations. In this way, Title I makes evident that its concept of 46 discrimination serves the goal of equal opportunity as well as that of equal treatment.
Under both the disparate impact theory and the reasonable 47 accommodations theory, a Title I plaintiff contends that the employer's equal treatment of its employees operated to deny the plaintiff equal opportunity and that the employer must alter that treatment because of its effect on the plaintiff or on those in the plaintiff's protected class. In other words, the plaintiff 48 demands that the employer not treat his disability as irrelevant, but rather take the disability into account. In contrast, the equal opportunity goal of Title II of the ADA-and the fact that the statute requires affirmative steps on the part of public entities-becomes apparent only after careful reading. First, the statute 49 defines "qualified individual with a disability," the class protected from discrimination by Title II, as encompassing a duty to make reasonable modifications: "The term 'qualified individual with a disability' means an individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable modifications to rules, policies, or practices . . . meets the essential eligibility requirements for . . . participation in programs or activities provided by a public entity." (8) equally enjoying any service, program, or activity, unless such criteria can be shown to be necessary for the provision of the service, program, or activity being offered.
51
They are required to "make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures when the modifications are necessary to avoid discrimination on the basis of disability, unless the public entity can demonstrate that making the modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of the service, program, or activity." Courts agree that Title II serves the goal of equal opportunity, 52 or "'meaningful access' to government programs and benefits," by imposing 53 a duty to refrain from disparate impact discrimination and to make reasonable modifications.
54
Title II's duty of reasonable modification and prohibition of disparate impact discrimination dictate that disability is a mandatory mitigating factor in lawyer disciplinary proceedings, provided that the attorney is a qualified individual with a disability. The attorney's disability status must be taken into account in determining the appropriate sanction. In re Rubenstein, a case 55 involving the request of an individual with a learning disability for additional time on the bar exam, provides a good analogy. Noting that "[t]he purpose of the ADA is to place those with disabilities on an equal footing and not to give them an unfair advantage," the court found that providing the plaintiff with 56 extra time on the bar exam was a reasonable modification required by the statute. Stating the same idea slightly differently, holding the learning-57 disabled plaintiff to the standard time limit for the bar exam would tend to screen her out from the benefit of admission to the bar, and the board of bar examiners could not show that the standard time limit was necessary. Equal 620 UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH LAW REVIEW [Vol. 69:609 58. Given that courts consider numerous mitigating factors in their sanctioning decisions, requiring them to consider disability seems unlikely to constitute a fundamental alteration, and ignoring this factor seems unlikely to be necessary. 59. Cf. Timmons, supra note 4, at 248 ("Just as workplaces that are not physically equipped to allow wheelchair access present obstacles to the employment opportunities of some disabled individuals, so too can workplace conduct policies that deem as disqualifying misconduct behavior that an individual with a disability may find impossible or nearly impossible to control." (footnote omitted)).
60. See ABA STANDARDS, supra note 13, § § 9.3, 9.32(c). Commentary to the standard provides only that "[c]ases concerning personal and emotional problems as mitigating factors include a wide range of difficulties, most often involving marital or financial problems." Id.
61. Id. § 9.32(i). 62. Id. § 9.32(g).
treatment of the learning-disabled plaintiff was not enough; extra time was required to provide her with equal opportunity. Similarly, taking a lawyer's disability into account in a disciplinary proceeding when the disability causes the lawyer to engage in misconduct constitutes a reasonable modification of attorney discipline policies. The modification is required unless the state bar can demonstrate that making the modification would fundamentally alter the nature of its regulation of the practice of law. Treating the attorney's disability as irrelevant to the sanctioning decision-when the disability led to misconduct that the attorney found very difficult to control-would tend to automatically screen that person out from the benefit of practicing law and thus violates the ADA unless the state bar can show that such treatment is necessary.
The equal 58 opportunity goal of Title II is not met by simply giving the attorney the same sanction that a non-disabled lawyer would receive.
59
Moreover, the equal opportunity goal of Title II is not met when disciplining authorities have complete discretion regarding whether to treat disability as a mitigating factor. The ABA Standards do not indicate that disability should be afforded any more weight in mitigation than "personal or emotional problems," despite the fact that disability is a protected trait under federal law. In fact, it is arguably more difficult for lawyers to rely on 60 disability as a mitigating factor because the lawyer must show a causal connection between the disability and the misconduct, recovery from the disability as evidenced by a sustained period of rehabilitation, and low likelihood of recurrence of the misconduct. In contrast, the ABA Standards 61 place no limits on the use of personal or emotional problems in mitigation. Other potential mitigating factors, like "character or reputation," often have 62 63. Leslie Levin argues that character and reputation evidence is "the most misused of all the mitigating factors" because " [c] ourts often use such evidence to justify their decisions to treat wellconnected lawyers leniently, without regard for whether the evidence provided is relevant to the misconduct or likely to predict a lawyer's future actions." Levin, supra note 16, at 54-55 (footnote omitted). According to Levin, courts should grant such evidence little to no weight in most discipline cases, because a good reputation is often due to the fact that attorney misconduct is hard to detect and the evidence is often provided by persons unfamiliar with the details of the attorney's practice or the alleged wrongdoing. Id. at 55.
64. See id. at 54 n.242 ("Character evidence is one of the variables predicting that a lawyer who converted client funds will not be disbarred"); id. at 54-55 ("Character and reputation evidence powerfully affects the sanctioning decision because the witnesses who provide it are often well-regarded members of the bench and bar.").
65. See, e.g., Disciplinary Counsel v. Hunter, 835 N.E.2d 707, 713-14 (Ohio 2005) . In Hunter, the lawyer's doctor testified that the lawyer's depression caused her misconduct and that he was confident that "she will have no debilitating recurrence of her former symptoms and can return to the competent and ethical practice of law." Id. at 713. The court nevertheless held that "[f]or theft and dishonesty of the magnitude committed in this case, the appropriate sanction is disbarment, even considering respondent's mental condition." Id. at 714; see also In re Greenberg, 714 A.2d 243, 254-55 (N.J. 1998 ) (applying jurisdiction's bright-line rule that misappropriation of funds mandated a sanction of disbarment to attorney whose depression caused his misconduct and who had undergone treatment such that he was unlikely to commit future misconduct); In re Floyd, 468 S.E.2d 302, 309-10 (S.C. 1996) ("While we have allowed evidence of depression to mitigate misconduct, we decline to do so here because of the serious nature of the misconduct, particularly regarding respondent's misappropriation of client funds and inducement of clients to borrow money from him." (citation omitted)).
66. See, e.g., In re Marshall, 762 A.2d 530, 537, 539 (D.C. 2000) (rejecting attorney's attempt to use cocaine addiction as a mitigating factor, given that his condition "was brought about, at least initially, by his own intentional violation of the law"); In re Demergian, 768 P.2d 1069 , 1074 (Cal. 1989 ocaine use is hardly a mitigating factor . . . [because the attorney] became addicted through voluntary use of an illicit drug."). One of the regulations interpreting Title II excludes from the statute's protection those currently using illegal drugs, but the regulation prohibits discrimination on the basis of illegal drug use against an individual who is not currently using illegal drugs and has been successfully rehabilitated or is participating in a supervised rehabilitation program. 28 C.F.R. § 35.131 (2007). little probative value, yet under the ABA Standards courts are free to give 63 them weight equal to, or even greater than, disability status.
64
Some courts have adopted bright-line rules rejecting disability as a mitigating factor under certain circumstances, and such rules are also likely to run afoul of the ADA. For example, courts have held that where the lawyer engages in serious misconduct, such as misappropriation of funds, the lawyer's disability is irrelevant. Other courts have held that where the 65 attorney's disability is addiction to an illegal substance, the disability is not a mitigating factor. These rules are consistent with the ADA only if they are 66 "necessary" for the regulation of the practice of law or if modifying them would "fundamentally alter" the regulation of the practice of law. In light of the primary purpose of lawyer discipline-client protection-it is unlikely that either bright-line rule would satisfy the ADA. Roebuck & Co., No. 4:95-CV-0215-HLM, 1996 WL 735565, at *7 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 28, 1996 ("Because of [p]laintiff's unreliable history of taking his medication, and his inability to suppress entirely the potential manifestation of further manic episodes, [p]laintiff poses an ongoing risk of combative physical exchanges with his co-workers, and even potential physical harm to others.").
B. "Qualified Individual with a Disability" and the Purposes of Attorney Discipline
As discussed above, disability is a mandatory mitigating factor in lawyer disciplinary proceedings provided that the attorney is a qualified individual with a disability, because only such individuals fall within the protection of the ADA. An attorney is qualified if she meets the essential eligibility requirements for the practice of law, with or without reasonable modifications to the policies of the bar. According to some courts, the fact that an attorney committed misconduct in the past renders the attorney unqualified. As 67 recognized by the Florida Supreme Court in Clement, however, "qualified" is primarily a prospective inquiry. The outcome of this inquiry should turn 68 more on whether the lawyer is likely to commit misconduct in the future than on whether the lawyer committed misconduct in the past.
An examination of Title I cases involving employees discharged for disability-related misconduct supports the forward-looking nature of the qualified standard. In Teahan v. Metro-North Commuter Railroad, the court 69 remanded the case for consideration of whether "the likelihood of relapse and future absenteeism" by the plaintiff indicated that he was not qualified for his position. The plaintiff's past disability-caused absenteeism did not render 70 him unqualified; what mattered was whether that absenteeism was likely to continue in the future. Husowitz v. Runyon involved a postal worker who 71 continued to make threats even after a year of therapy and soon after the postal service permitted him to return to work following a suspension for threatening his supervisor with physical violence. Because it was likely that the postal 72 worker's threatening behavior would continue in the future, the court found him unqualified for his job. The fact that courts must examine whether any reasonable accommodation would enable the individual to refrain from future misconduct reinforces the fact that the qualified inquiry is future-focused.
74
The prospective nature of the qualified inquiry is also consistent with what most courts state is the primary purpose of lawyer discipline: protection of the public, rather than punishment of the attorney. As stated by the Minnesota Supreme Court, "The purpose of the attorney discipline system is not to punish the wrongdoer but to protect the public." In his article, The
75
Purposes of Lawyer Discipline, Fred C. Zacharias agrees that "the role of retribution in lawyer discipline is questionable" and that a "reasonable view of discipline . . . is that its function is to assure competence rather than to lay blame." Given this function, Professor Zacharias asserts that disability and 76 subsequent rehabilitation should lessen the sanction imposed on an alcoholic lawyer who stole client funds:
[I]f the lawyer truly is rehabilitated and the cause of his misconduct is eliminated, the disciplinary agency has no basis for finding the lawyer incompetent. Nor is the lawyer likely to commit similar misconduct in the future. Recognizing that rehabilitation will lessen or eliminate discipline may serve to encourage other alcoholic lawyers to seek treatment, which indirectly serves the interests of their future clients and the legal system generally.
77
Some courts have stated that additional purposes of lawyer discipline are maintaining the integrity of the legal profession and public confidence in the bar. It could be argued that these purposes suggest that disability should not the fact that courts typically consider numerous mitigating circumstances in determining a sanction; they do not automatically conclude that due to the need to maintain the integrity of the legal profession and public confidence in the bar a lawyer should receive the harshest possible sanction. Given that courts consider other mitigating factors, there can be no justification for them ignoring disability-the one factor required by federal law. If a victimized client is unlikely to care that her lawyer misappropriated funds because of a disability, the client is also unlikely to care that the misappropriating lawyer had personal problems or a great reputation in the legal community. Similarly, while it is a valid concern of the bar to avoid the cynicism that will develop in the public if it believes that lawyers never face any discipline for their wrongdoing, this goal should not be achieved on the backs of 80 lawyers with disabilities. There are many problems with the public image of lawyers, including the public's lack of trust in the effectiveness of the lawyer disciplinary system. The way to solve those problems is not to ignore the federally protected rights of attorneys with disabilities.
In cases involving disability-related misconduct, courts should focus on the goal of protecting the public and on the likelihood of the attorney committing future misconduct. Courts that have suggested that ignoring disability is necessary to protect the public-with statements like, "The purpose of disciplinary proceedings is the protection of the public and the need for protection is the same whether or not the attorney is mentally impaired" -are misguided. If a lawyer committed misconduct because of a 81 disability, and he has received treatment for the disability such that it is unlikely to manifest itself in the form of future misconduct, considering the disability as a mitigating factor poses little threat to the public. Unlike in many disciplinary proceedings, here there is an identifiable reason why the misconduct occurred and grounds for confidence that it will not recur. As 82. See Zacharias, supra note 76, at 681. 83. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 13, § 9.32(i)(3). 84. See, e.g., State ex rel. Okla. Bar Ass'n v. Wright, 957 P.2d 1174 , 1180 (Okla. 1997 (noting that lawyer's depression had only been stabilized on his current medication for two weeks prior to his disciplinary hearing, and lawyer had "a history of initial success with medication that later proves ineffective").
85. Without referencing the ADA, the Ohio Supreme Court took this approach in Columbus Bar Association v. Winkfield, 839 N.E.2d 924 (2006) . The lawyer in Winkfield demonstrated a causal connection between his personality disorder and his misconduct but "continued to show signs of illness that . . . preclude [d] his competent and ethical practice of law." Id. at 932, 933. Because the lawyer's social worker reported significant improvement that was likely to continue, the court ordered an indefinite suspension rather than disbarment, to give the lawyer "the chance to prove himself in the future." Id. at 933. 86. See, e.g., In re Conduct of Coyner, 149 P.3d 1118 , 1123 (Or. 2006 he accused has made significant strides. But those strides are too recent and too incomplete to satisfy us that the accused has recognized by Professor Zacharias, rewarding treatment in this way is likely to encourage other lawyers with disabilities to seek treatment, which will benefit their clients.
82
The ABA Standards properly focus on the likelihood of the disabled attorney committing future misconduct, but they may take too strict an approach. Under the ABA Standards, disability may be a mitigating circumstance only if the lawyer has been completely rehabilitated for a sustained period.
This policy choice has its merits: how can one be 83 confident that an attorney's disability-related misconduct will not recur if the attorney has not demonstrated a sustained, as opposed to brief, period of rehabilitation? Given the prospective nature of the qualified inquiry, 84 however, perhaps disability should be a mitigating factor even if full rehabilitation has not yet occurred. If the lawyer is undergoing treatment for the disability, but the treatment is not complete at the time of the court's decision, the court could take the disability into account and order an indefinite suspension. The attorney then would be allowed to petition for reinstatement once treatment is completed and a sufficient recovery period has passed. Using the terms of the ADA, an attorney is qualified if reasonable modification of a policy would enable her to meet the essential eligibility requirements for the practice of law. More time for treatment and recovery could be a reasonable modification that could enable the lawyer to meet the essential eligibility requirement of being unlikely to commit disciplinary violations in the future. This approach is preferable to that taken by the 85 ABA Standards, under which if the attorney is not fully recovered at the time of the court's decision, the fact that the disability caused the attorney's misconduct is irrelevant. [and] shall limit his practice to criminal prosecutions as an assistant county attorney in a county attorney's office in which the county attorney has a minimum of 10 years of experience as the county attorney."); Lawyer Disciplinary Bd. v. Dues, 624 S.E.2d 125, 133-34 (W. Va. 2005) ("As a result of the direct connection between Mr. Dues' mental disability and the misconduct in this case, we are of the opinion that limiting his practice [to work as a mental hygiene commissioner], as opposed to suspending his license, serves as an effective deterrent to other members of the Bar and maintains the public confidence in the ethical standards of the legal profession."); Cuyahoga County Bar Ass'n v. Freedman, 836 N.E.2d 559, 561 (Ohio 2005) ("[The attorney] has also relied on the services of a professional management consultant to help him set up more effective procedures in his law office."); Sheridan's Case, 813 A.2d 449, 454 (N.H. 2002) ("The [attorney] claims that he can overcome his lawyering deficiencies caused by his mental disorder through the structure and organization provided by a secretary.").
89. Samuel R. Bagenstos, Subordination, Stigma, and "Disability," 86 VA. L. REV. 397, 427 (2000) (stating that "virtually the entire ideology of the modern disability rights movement can be seen as a reaction to [the] 'medical/pathological paradigm' of disability," which "focused on medical treatment, physical rehabilitation, charity, and public assistance").
90. See id. at 427 (noting that the medical model treats disability "as an inherent personal Another potential problem with the ABA Standards is their suggestion that a lawyer's disability can be a mitigating factor only if the disability has been cured. The standards provide not only that recurrent misconduct must be unlikely, but also that "the respondent's recovery from the chemical dependency or mental disability [must be] demonstrated by a meaningful and sustained period of successful rehabilitation."
The use of the word 87 "recovery" indicates that the drafters of the standards contemplated a mentally disabled lawyer receiving medication or therapy such that he is cured. The drafters failed to acknowledge other means by which an attorney could show that he is unlikely to commit future misconduct, such as restructuring his practice to avoid the limitations caused by the disability. Depending on the nature of the disability and the misconduct, possibilities include no longer being a sole practitioner, hiring support personnel, limiting one's practice to a particular practice area, or reducing the number of cases one handles.
88
The ABA Standards' focus on recovery from disability as the only means of proving low likelihood of recurrent misconduct is consistent with the oftcriticized medical model of disability. The medical model of disability treats 91. Bagenstos, supra note 89, at 428. Professor Bagenstos provides the example of a person with paralysis who will be unable to work if workplace entrances are too narrow to accommodate a wheelchair or accessible only by stairs. Id. at 429. He notes that, although the person's paralysis is real, "it is not her physical impairment that has disabled her: What has disabled her is the set of social choices that has created a built environment that confines wheelchair users to their homes." Id. at 429; see also Hensel, supra note 90, at 1145 (describing an individual confined to a wheelchair as disabled only "as a result of the design and construction of the facility rather than any inherent biological problem").
92 (2000) ("While protecting the public and the integrity of the bar is certainly a worthy policy goal, it does not justify punishing disabled attorneys for conduct over which they had no control."); Stephen M. Hines, Note, Attorneys: The Hypocrisy of the Anointed: The Refusal of the Oklahoma Supreme Court to Extend Antidiscrimination Laws to Attorneys in Bar Disciplinary Hearings, 49 OKLA. L. REV. 731, 744 (1996) ("Some courts have argued that they already account for the disciplined attorney's disability because the disability may mitigate any disciplinary action. However, in the overwhelming majority of these instances, the attorney still faces punishment for misconduct he may have had no control over." (footnote omitted)).
which underlies the ADA, views disability as "the interaction between societal barriers (both physical and otherwise) and the impairment." In determining 91 whether an attorney meets the essential requirement of being unlikely to commit future misconduct and is thus qualified, the social model of disability requires consideration of possible changes to the attorney's work environment. Such consideration is particularly important in the context of mental disabilities, which "can be greatly exacerbated or greatly ameliorated by the quality of interpersonal contact and the nature of the environment."
92
The forward-looking approach to disability-related misconduct might suggest that the only factor relevant to the sanctioning decision is whether the attorney is likely to commit misconduct in the future. In fact, some commentators have argued that if an attorney's disability caused her to commit misconduct, she should receive no discipline at all. Under most 93 circumstances, though, the disability-related nature of a lawyer's misconduct does not justify completely excusing the misconduct.
C. Causation, Fault, and Deterrence
According to some commentators, if an attorney's disability causes his misconduct, imposing any discipline on the attorney constitutes unfair
